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NOTES
cy.. ." can be taken to suggest the criterion of an intentional act entailing
severe consequences which the employee could foresee at the time of his
act.
Another solution would be to define dishonesty in terms of some type
of motive or mental state. One line of cases requires a jury finding that a
desire for personal gain or an intent to harm the employer was a motive.
See Universal Credit Co. v. United States Guarantee Co., supra. Others
require a culpable state of mind, but employ the relatively vague terms of
"bad faith," "improper motive," or "moral turpitude." Western Surety
Co. v. May Mercantzle Ass'n, supra; National Surety Co. v. Williams, 74
Fla. 446, 77 So. 212 (1917); Exeter Banking Co. v. Taylor, 85 N.H. 458,
160 Atl. 733 (1932); First State Bank v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 125
Tex. 113, 79 S.W.2d 835 (1935). According to the latter view, a mere
breach of company rules, for example, would not render the surety liable.
World Exchange Bank v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 1, 173 N.E.
902 (1930); American Surety Co. v. Gracey, 252 S.W. 263 (Tex.Civ.App.
1923).
Jurisdictions which reject malice or the desire for personal profit as
essential elements of "dishonesty" give the term a broad meaning and
impose liability for conduct which is "grossly unfair" or in "reckless dis-
regard" of the rightof f the employer. Irving Jacobs & Co. v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co., 202 F.2d 794 (7th Gir. 1953); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bates,
76 F.2d 160 (8th Gir. 1935). In the Irving Jacobs case the court ruledthat the trial court had correctly submitted the question of dishonesty to
the jury with the instruction that the policy did not protect the employer
against ordinary negligence. In the principal case, on the other hand, the
court found as a matter of law that the employee's dereliction was dis-
honest although it was not prompted by personal gain or malice. To
predicate liability on the type of conduct involved in this case, a mal-
feasance knowingly undertaken in reckless disregard of the employer's
interests is, in effect, to include gross negligence within the coverage ofthe fidelity bond.
The test of willfulness, unqualified by the requirement of a culpable
state of mind, disregards the normal intention of the parties to the in-
surance contract. The main purpose of fidelity insurance is to protect
against losses which good management cannot prevent; i.e., wrongful acts
deliberately planned by the employee to enrich himself at company ex-
pense or to injure the business. If the company needs coverage for losses
caused by neglect and carelessness, the protection is available at addi-
tional cost. The rule of the Universal Credit Co. case seems to appreciate
the intention of the parties and provides a more explicit standard for
adjudication of the cases.
William L. Bowers, Jr.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-LIS PENDENS-FILING OF LIS PENDENS
NOTICE NOT PniivLE.-Albertson v. Raboff, 287 P.2d
146 (Cal. 1956).
In a prior action baboff had sued Albertson, seeking a money judg-
ment and either a lien on Albertson's real property or a judgment de-
taring that her title was obtainedin fraud of creditors. Raboff recorded
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a notice of pendency of this action and subsequently obtained a money
judgment, but Albertson prevailed on the counts concerning the real
property. In the present action, Albertson alleged that Raboff had known
when he had filed his prior complaint that he had no right to an interest
in her property, that he had nevertheless knowingly and maliciously
asserted false claims thereto, and that by recording a lis pendens notice
he had disparaged her title. The trial court dismissed the action on the
ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action. Reversed.
An action for slander of title must be predicated on a false and mali-
cious publication or statement which causes special damages. Witmer v.
Valley Nat'l Bank, 223 Iowa 671, 273 N.W. 370 (1937); Cawrse v. Sig-
nal Oil Co., 164 Ore. 666, 103 P.2d 729 (1940); Humble Oil & Refining
Co. v. Luckel, 171 S.W.2d 902 (Tex.Civ.App. 1943, error ref'd want of
merit). To prove special damages the plaintiff must show that some
pending sale was defeated by the slander, general diminution of market
value not being sufficient. Zimmerman v. Hinderlider, 105 Colo. 340, 97
P.2d 443 (1939); Shell Oil Co. v. Howth, 138 Tex. 357, 159 S.W.2d 483
(1942); Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Martin, 5 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.Civ.
App. 1928, error dism'd). The plaintiff was successful in slander of title
suits involving the defendants' recordation of the instruments in the
following cases: Coley v. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 272 Pac. 1045 (1928) (ab-
stract of judgment); Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 134 P.2d 217
(1943) (writ of execution for satisfaction of judgment); Walley v. Hunt,
212 Miss. 294, 54 So.2d 393 (1951) (deed); Winn v. Warner, 199 S.W.
2d 560 (Tex.Civ.App. 1947, error ref'd n.r.e.) (affidavit claiming inter-
est in oil and gas lease); First Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 7 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.
Civ.App. 1928, error dism'd) (judgment lien).
If a publication or statement is privileged, no action for libel or slander
will lie. Caller Times Publishing Co. v. Chandler, 134 Tex. 1, 130 S.W.
2d 853 (1939). The Texas statute on the subject of privilege is repre-
sentative, and states that a fair, true, impartial account of the proceed-
ings in a court of justice or in any other official proceeding shall not be
made the basis of any action for libel. TEx. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948)
art. 5432. There is some conflict about what statements or publications
are privileged. For example, a New York court has held that a pleading
is privileged when it is acted upon in due course of the judicial process
or as a preliminary thereto, Brown v. Central Savings Bank, 64 N.Y.S.2d
551 (1946); further, the privilege attaches to the republication of state-
ments made in pleadings from the moment the pleadings are filed. Camp-
bell v. New York Evening Post, Inc., 245 N.Y. 320, 157 N.E. 153 (1927).
On the other hand, in Texas the republication of statements made in
pleadings is not privileged in a situation where the court has had no
opportunity to prohibit publication. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.
v. McDavid, 173 S.W. 467 (Tex.Civ.App. 1914, error ref'd), cited with
approval in Caller Times Publishing Co. v. Chandler, supra.
The Texas lis pendens statute is similar to those of other states. It
provides that during the pendency of a suit involving any right or in-
terest in real estate a party seeking affirmative relief may file a notice
of pendency. T.x. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6640. The filing is
notice to all the world of the suit pending, TEx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon,
1948) art. 6643, and prevents effective transfers of the property free of
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the claims asserted therein. TEx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6642;
City Nat'l Bank v. Craig, 113 Tex. 375, 257 S.W. 210 (1923); Black v.
Burd, 255 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.Civ.App. 1953, error ref'd n.r.e.). The no-
tice given by lis pendens includes all facts apparent on the face of the
pleadings in the suit, and other facts which could reasonably be inferred
from them. Harris v. Whittier Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 18 Cal. App.2d 260,
63 P.2d 840 (1936); Mason v. Olds, 198 S.W. 1040 (Tex.Civ.App. 1917,
error ref'd). The notice operates only during the pendency of the suit
and terminates with judgment, unless an appeal is prosecuted. Garcia
v. Pinhero, 22 Cal. App.2d 194, 70 P.2d 675 (1937); Johnson v. Marti,
214 S.W. 726 (Tex.Civ.App. 1919, error ref'd). However, in Hexter v.
Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Comm.App. 1928) an abstract disclosed a lis
pendens notice and a dismissal of the suit; the court held that it was still
notice of an adverse claim since the dismissal was not a ruling on the
merits of the case.
Is the lis pendens notice privileged or can it be used as a basis for an
action of slander of title? In Sellars v. Grant, 196 F.2d 677 (5th Cir.
1952) and New Orleans Land Co. v. Slattery, 145 La. 256, 82 So. 215
(1919) the courts dismissed actions for slander of title based on such
notices, but only because they found that the filing was not malicious,
thereby implying that if the filing had been malicious, it would not have
been privileged and would have been actionable. The latter proposition
became the actual basis for decision in West Investment Co. v. Moor-
head, 120 Cal. App.2d 837, 262 P.2d 322 (1953). In the principal case
the court closely followed the reasoning of the West Investment Co. case,
stating that the privilege granted to communications in the actual course
of a judicial proceeding does not extend to a lis pendens notice since its
recordation is a private act, outside the purview of judicial proceedings,
undertaken for the purpose of calling attention to the pendency of liti-
gation. It is arguable that denial of the privilege will inhibit use of the
lis pendens procedure and thereby defeat its purpose. However, malice
is necessary for an action of slander of title; hence a lis pendens notice
recorded with probable cause and in good faith would furnish no basis
for the action. Since recording of a lis pendens notice constitutes a repub-
lication of the pleadings, West Investment Co. v. Moorhead, supra, an
analogy can be drawn to actions involving republication of statements
made in pleadings. On this analogy the New York view concerning such
cases would lead to the conclusion that the lis pendens notice is privi-
leged, but the principle of Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. McDavid,
supra, that republication is privileged only when the court has had the
opportunity to prohibit it, leads to the contrary conclusion. Since the
recording of a lis pendens notice is not subject to judicial control, it
would not be privileged, and it would be actionable upon proof that the
claim was false and that the notice was filed maliciously.
Frank W. Elliott, Jr.
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